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YOU MAY KILL, BUT YOU MUST PROMISE NOT
TO USE DISCRETION: FURMAN v. GEORGIA 1
Furman v. Georgia was a case of immediate and dramatic impact.
Fully six hundred prisoners on American death rows awaited its out-
come, the decision promising to determine for each of them whether he
should live or die.2 The validity of hundreds of statutes, enacted
by the Congress of the United States8 and the legislatures of forty-one
states,4 was called into question when the United States Supreme Court
decided to review the cases of three petitioners under sentence of death,
the Court limiting its grants of certiorari to the following question:
"Does the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in [these
cases] constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?" 5
Each of the three petitioners had been sentenced to death by a jury
empowered to impose the death penalty or a lesser punishment for the
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2. Id. at 316, 417.
3. Federal crimes punishable by death included treason, 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1970);
assassination of the President, Vice President, or those who stand elected to those po-
sitions, 18 U.S.C. § 1751 (1970); assassination of a member or member-elect of
Congress, 18 U.S.C. § 351 (1970); espionage, 18 U.S.C. § 794 (1970); rape within
the special federal maritime jurisdiction, 18 U.S.C. § 2031 (1970); causing death
through destruction of aircraft or motor vehicles engaged in interstate commerce, 18
U.S.C. § 34 (1970); explosives offenses where death results, 18 U.S.C. § 844(d)
and (f) (1970); aircraft piracy, 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i) (1970); train wrecking where
death results, 18 U.S.C. § 1992 (1970); and capital punishment provisions in various
articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 885, 890, 894, 899, 901,
904, 906, 913, 918, and 920 (1970).
4. The only states lacking the death penalty are Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. H. BEDEAU, Tn
DEATH PENALTY iN AmEmRICA (1967) (hereinafter cited as BEDFAU). The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court declared the death penalty to violate this state's counterpart of
the federal cruel and unusual punishments clause in People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d
628, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972). See CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 6. Anderson has since been nullified by referendum amendment of the
California Constitution. See note 122 infra.
5. 403 U.S. 952 (1971). The Eighth Amendment provides in full: Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
of the Eighth Amendment has been held to apply to the several states by virtue of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660 (1962). See notes 31 and 92 infra.
NOTES
same crime." William Furman had been convicted of felony mur-
der for the killing of a Georgia householder returning to his home,
which Furman had entered to burglarize.7  The victim was shot
through a closed door when Furman accidentally tripped over a wire
in his attempt to escape.8 The two other petitioners had been con-
victed of rape. Lucious Jackson, an escaped convict at the time of his
crime, entered a Georgia home and raped a woman while pressing a
pair of scissors against her neck.9 Elmer Branch raped and then
threatened to kill a 65 year old Texas widow. 10 All three petitioners
were black." Each contested the validity of his sentence rather than
his conviction.'
2
Each of the nine United States Supreme Court justices filed a sepa-
rate opinion. Justices Brennan and Marshall concluded that the im-
position of the death penalty was unconstitutional per se in that it
constituted "cruel and unusual punishment" within the meaning of
the Eighth Amendment.' 3 Justice Douglas, finding the death penalty
in these cases to be discriminatorily imposed, ruled that its execution
would violate notions of equal protection implicit in the Eighth Amend-
ment. 4 Justice Stewart, specifically exempting mandatory death penal-
ties from his consideration, concluded death sentences imposed by
juries with the power to impose a lesser punishment were violative
of the Eighth Amendment.' 5 Justice White, also explicity declining to
decide if the death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment per
se,' 6 found it indefensible when imposed so infrequently as to serve
no purpose.' 7  Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Blackmun, Powell,
and Rehnquist each filed dissenting opinions, all but Justice Rehnquist
professing personal objections to the institution of capital punishment,
but holding the repeal of that penalty to be within the purview of the
legislative branch alone.'8
6. 408 U.S. at 240.
7. Furman v. State, 167 S.E.2d 628 (Ga. 1969).
8. Id. at 629.
9. 408 U.S. at 252. See Jackson v. State, 171 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. 1969).
10. 408 U.S. at 253. See Branch v. State, 447 S.W.2d 932, 933 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App.
1969).
11. 408 U.S. at 252-53.
12. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
13. 408 U.S. at 305, 359-62.
14. Id. at 256-57.
15. Id. at 309-10.
16. Id. at 310-11.
17. Id. at 313-14.
18. Id. at 403-04, 410, 418, 468.
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THE MAJORITY PERSPECTIVE
The opinion of Justice Brennan may serve as both a microcosm of
the concurring opinions and a prism through which to view them, for
each member of the majority decided Furman on one or more of four
principles developed in Brennan's opinion.
Justice Brennan's approach to the Eighth Amendment rested heav-
ily on Trop v. Dulles.9 The plurality opinion of Chief Justice War-
ren in Trop held that the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society"20 and that the punishment of denationalization violated
such standards.2" Chief Justice Warren's view of the nature of the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause was that:
The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less
than the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish,
the Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within
the limits of civilized standards.
-22
Justice Brennan's debt to Trop may be seen by comparing Chief
Justice Warren's language with Brennan's own formulation of the
essence of the Eighth Amendment in Furman:
At bottom, then, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits
the infliction of uncivilized and inhuman punishments. The State, even
as it punishes, must treat its members with respect for their intrinsic
worth as human beings. A punishment is "cruel and unusual," there-
fore, if it does not comport with human dignity.23
Justice Brennan's opinion is composed of the discussion and appli-
cation of four principles "recognized in our cases and inherent in the
Clause sufficient to permit a judicial determination whether a chal-
lenged punishment comports with human dignity."
24
He summarized the four principles thus:
If a punishment is unusually severe, if there is a strong probability
that it is inflicted arbitrarily, if it is substantially rejected by contem-
19. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). The Court invalidated a provision of the Nationality Act
of 1940, (8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(8) (1970)) under which an American national was
stripped of his American citizenship by reason of both his conviction by court-martial
for desertion from the Armed Forces in time of war and dishonorable discharge for
that conviction. Id. at 88.
20. Id. at 101.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 100.




porary society, and if there is no reason to believe that it serves any
penal purpose more effectively than some less severe punishment, then
the continued infliction of that punishment violates the command of
the Clause that the State may not inflict inhuman and uncivilized
punishments upon those convicted of crimes.
25
These principles-unusual severity, arbitrariness, moral unaccepta-
bility, lack of necessity-were viewed by Justice Brennan as overlap-
ping. The Justice's analysis of the Court's prior Eighth Amendment de-
cisions G led him to the conclusion that a cruel and unusual punish-
ment's affront to human dignity could not often be catalogued un-
der any single principle. Such punishments "seriously implicated"
several principles which the Court had applied "in combination" by
finding that previous punishments outraged human dignity. The
four tests therefore were to be viewed as "interrelated, and in most
cases it will be their convergence that will justify the conclusion that a
punishment is 'cruel and unusual.' The test, then, will ordinarily be
a cumulative one.. "28
A. Unusual Severity
The primary principle ... is that a punishment must not by its se-
verity be degrading to human dignity.
29
Justice Brennan argued that a punishment may be so severe as to be
degrading to human dignity if it entails mental or physical suffer-
ing.30 The degree of pain, however, is not the essence of an unusually se-
25. Id. at 282. For a similar expression of these principles, see text accompanying
note 174 infra.
26. 408 U.S. at 282.
27. Id. at 281.
28. Id. at 282. Justice Brennan's description of his test as "cumulative" is not to
be understood as requiring that a challenged punishment fall within all four principles.
Before it can be invalidated, it is rather to be viewed as a synergistic whole composed
of interrelating and mutually reinforcing elements. An analogy might be drawn to
the probative effect of evidence, where the totality of the elements often compels an in-
ference unwarranted by any one of them individually.
29. Id. at 281.
30. Id. at 271-73. The Justice gave as an example of mental pain, the uncertainty
and lack of identity experienced by one subjected to denationalization. See Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 110-11 (1958) (Brennan, J., concurring); see text accompanying
notes 19-23 supra. Also cited to exemplify impermissibly severe mental suffering was
the anguish of one who must undergo a second preparation for death, as in Louisiana
ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) where, while rejecting the argu-
ment that subjecting the petitioner to another preparation for electrocution after a
power failure had aborted the first attempt would be unconstitutionally cruel and un-
usual, the Court did indicate that the deliberate infliction of such mental anguish would
not be permitted. Id. at 463-64.
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vere punishment. Its "true significance [is that it treats] members of
the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and dis-
carded [thus violating] the fundamental premise of the Clause that
even the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of com-
mon human dignity."'
Justice Brennan thought the death penalty met his description of an
unusually severe punishment. The death penalty, he asserted, is
unique among modem punishments because it alone involves the
conscious infliction of physical pain.3 2  It is unique in the degree of
mental distress accompanying it.33 Destroying a person's very exist-
ence is unique in its finality and enormity.34 He concluded that the
death penalty was therefore "uniquely degrading" to human dignity and
would have rejected it on that basis alone were it not for its "longstand-
ing usage and acceptance. ' 3'  He, therefore, considered his second
31. 408 U.S. at 272-73. Discarding a human being as an object was exemplified
by a California statute punishing a narcotics addict for his affliction by criminalizing
the status of addiction. The Court struck down that statute in Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962), because it "would doubtless be universally thought to be an in-
fliction of cruel and unusual punishment." Id. at 666.
32. 408 U.S. at 288. The Resweber Court had indicated a willingness to accept the
pain accompanying execution: "The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a
convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suf-
fering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely." 329 U.S. at
464. See note 30 supra.
33. 408 U.S. at 288-89. See R. HAmMBR, BETwEEN Lwn AND DEATH 222-35, 244-
50, 269-72 (1969); Bluestone and McGahee, Reaction to Extreme Stress: Impending
Death by Execution, 119 AmR. J. PsYcH. 393 (1962); Note, Mental Suffering under
Sentence of Death: A Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 57 IowA L. Rnv. 814 (1972).
See generally the authorities collected by Justice Brennan, 408 U.S. at 288-89 n.36.
34. 408 U.S. at 289-90. Justice Brennan contrasted the awesome finality and
enormity of execution to imprisonment, which does not deny the criminal "the right
to have rights" such as access to the courts and freedom of religion. The executed
criminal obviously has no such rights. This comparison does not reveal how locking
a man in prison is consistent with the reverence for human dignity demanded by
Justice Brennan. See, e.g., Note, Sexual Assaults and Forced Homosexual Relationships
in Prison: Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 36 ALBANY L. REv. 428 (1972); Wagner
and Cohen, Attica: A Look at the Causes and the Future, 7 CIuM. L. BuLL. 817
(1971).
On the other hand, Justice Brennan does not need to demonstrate that imprison-
ment is thoroughly consistent with human dignity; instead he must merely indicate
that he prefers the perhaps lesser denial of human dignity accompanying incarceration
to the absolute rejection inherent in the death penalty.
35. 408 U.S. at 291. It is interesting to note that this argument is uniquely Justice
Brennan's. No other Justice espoused it; none rebutted it.
Justice Brennan did not rely on this principle alone, but quickly coupled it with his
second principle. This is the cumulative test referred to in note 28 and accompanying
text supra. One cannot help but be curious why the death penalty's "longstanding




[T]he State must not arbitrarily inflict a severe punishment. This
principle derives from the notion that the State does not respect human
dignity when, without reason, it inflicts upon some people a severe
punishment that it does not inflict upon others.36
Although for Justice Brennan it is but one element of a four part
test,3 7 arbitrariness is the pivotal issue in the Furman decision. It is
an issue basic to the opinions of Justices Stewart,3 8 White,39 and Doug-
las,40 each of whom would restrict the application of his views to sen-
tencing piocedures allowing arbitrary or discriminatory infliction of
the death penalty.
Justice Brennan observed that during the years 1961 to 1970 juries
had imposed an average of only 106 death sentences annually and
that less than half of those were actually carried out.4" The contrast
between the decline in the number of executions 42 and the current
increase in capital crimes43 led to the conclusion that death, inflicted
in but a "trivial number' 4  of cases, "is not the ordinary punishment
for any crime.
' 4 1
Many capital crimes are committed annually; few perpetrators are
sentenced to death; still less are executed. Those sentenced to die are
rarely responsible for the most serious crimes. For example, peti-
tioner Furman was guilty of an "accidental" felony murder.46  While
appear to modify his first principle as follows: a punishment so severe as to be de-
grading to human dignity is cruel and unusual unless it has long been accepted. This
recognition of the nation's acquiescence in the principle of capital punishment also
qualifies the Justice's later insistence that the death penalty is morally unacceptable
to American values. See notes 125-34 and accompanying text infra.
36. 408 U.S. at 274.
37. See notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text.
38. See notes 48, 72-73 infra and accompanying text.
39. See notes 49-50, 74 infra and accompanying text.
40. See note 71 infra and accompanying text.
41. 408 U.S. at 291, 292 nn.42-44.
42. "In the 1930's, executions averaged 167 per year; in the 1940's, the average
was 128; in the 1950's, it was 72; and in the years 1960-62, it was 48. There have
been a total of 46 executions since then, 36 of them in 1963-1964." Id. at 291
(footnote omitted).
43. Id. at 291. See also E. ScHnu, OuR CUmNAL Socia'Y 27-28 (1969). (In 1967
the F.B.I. reported 12,093 instances of murder or non-negligent manslaughter, a rate of
6.1 per 100,000 of population).
44. 408 U.S. at 293.
45. Id. at 291.
46. See text accompanying notes 7-8 supra, note 55 infra; 408 U.S. at 294 n.48.
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his transgression was certainly serious, it would be difficult to clas-
sify it among the hundred most vicious in any given year. It is ques-
tionable whether the criminal justice system operates with such preci-
sion and nicety as to accurately separate out for annual execution
America's fifty most heinous criminals. Such a belief, improbable
even on a priori level, is wholly rebutted by the facts in Furman.
Justice Brennan believed that this situation raised an inference of
arbitrary punishment-there could be no real distinction between
the handful actually executed and many of the vast number imprisoned.
When a country of over 200 million people inflicts an unusually
severe punishment no more than 50 times a year, the inference is
strong that the punishment is not being regularly and fairly applied.
...Indeed, it smacks of little more than a lottery system.41
Justice Stewart expressed the same idea:
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that
being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people
convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968 . ..petitioners are
among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sen-
tence of death has in fact been imposed.48
Although he also decided the case on the basis that the death pen-
alty as applied to the petitioners no longer served any purpose,40 Jus-
tice White observed that "the death penalty is exacted with great infre-
quency even for the most atrocious crimes. . . there is no meaningful
basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the
many cases in which it is not."50
Chief Justice Burger advanced a contrary argument. He contended
that the rare imposition of the death penalty was evidence of an in-
creasing meticulousness on the part of juries51 who, acting as "the
conscience of the community,"52 impose or refrain from imposing the
death penalty, influenced by such factors as the motivation and bru-
tality of the criminal, and the suffering of the victim. 3 The Chief
Justice concluded that "to assume from the mere fact of relative in-
frequency that only a random assortment of pariahs are sentenced to
47. 408 U.S. at 293.
48. Id. at 309-10 (footnotes omitted).
49. Id. at 311-13.
50. Id. at 313.
51. Id. at 388.
52. Id, quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968).
53. 408 U.S. at 388.
cvol. 6
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death, is to cast grave doubt on the basic integrity of our jury sys-
tem."
54
The Chief Justice's argument, then, would seem to be that, with
aberrant exceptions, the fifty or so felons executed each year are among
the fifty or so worst felons. Such unbridled confidence in the prescience
of juries appears misplaced; as pointed out by Justice Brennan: "If,
for example, petitioner Furman or his crime illustrates the 'extreme,'
then nearly all murderers and the murders are also 'extreme.' -"
Justices Brennan, Stewart and White saw the death penalty as sense-
lessly, randomly imposed.56 Concluding that no distinction could be
made between criminals in capital cases sentenced to death and those
sentenced to lesser punishments, they characterized the fact finder's
decision as arbitrary.
Justice Douglas, however, saw a clear, though illegitimate, basis for
making a distinction between those executed and those spared: the
impermissible criteria of race and class.57 He regarded the sentencing
54. Id. at 388-89.
55. Id. at 294 (footnote omitted). Furman, frightened by the return of the home-
owner whose house he was robbing, accidentally shot and killed the householder
through a closed door when Furman tripped over a wire in his attempt to escape. See
notes 7-8 supra and accompanying text. Jackson and Branch had been convicted of
rape. See notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text. Certainly Justice Brennan was
correct in arguing that these three petitioners had not committed three of the most
heinous crimes out of the thousands of capital crimes committed in any one year. He
did not point out, however, that by denying juries the power to sentence the Fur-
mans of the world to death, he would also deny them the discretion to so sentence the
most vicious of offenders.
56. See notes 36-55 and accompanying text supra.
57. 408 U.S. at 249-52. Justice Douglas, by way of example, contrasted the fates of
black and white defendants in Texas between 1924 and 1968. 88.4% of blacks sen-
tenced to death were actually executed, but only 79.8% of whites. Id. at 250 n.15,
citing BEDAU, supra note 4. In addition, he noted the opinions of former Warden
Lawes of Sing Sing and former Attorney General Ramsey Clark to the effect that a poor
defendant is far more likely to be sentenced to death than a rich one. Id. at 251.
Justice Douglas perhaps regarded the discriminatory impact of the death penalty as
self evident and hence did not provide a great deal of supporting data. The statistics
assembled by Justice Marshall, however, strongly indicate that Justice Douglas' as-
sumptions were correct: 2,066 of the 3,859 persons executed since 1930 were black.
Id. at 364.
But see the rebuttal of Justice Burger arguing that such racial discrimination was
the case only in the "distant past." Id. at 390. Justice Powell also addressed himself
to the argument that the death penalty is being applied in a discretionary manner.
Certainly the claim is justified that this criminal sanction falls more heavily
on the relatively impoverished and underprivileged elements of society. The
"have-nots" in every society always have been subject to greater pressure to com-
mit crimes and to fewer constraints than their more affluent fellow citizens. This
is, indeed, a tragic byproduct of social and economic deprivation, but it is not
an argument of constitutional proportions under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amend-
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process in capital cases as not merely arbitrary, but invidiously dis-
criminatory. Since the Eighth Amendment was designed to be read "in
light of the English pioscription against selective and irregular use of
penalties, '5 8 Justice Douglas held:
ment. The same discriminatory impact argument could be made with equal force
and logic with respect to those sentenced to prison terms. The Due Process
Clause admits of no distinction between the deprivation of "life" and the depri-
vation of "liberty." If discriminatory impact renders capital punishment cruel
and unusual, it likewise renders invalid most of the prescribed penalties for
crimes of violence. The root causes of the higher incidence of criminal penalties
on "minorities and the poor" will not be cured by abolishing the sytmof penal-
ties. Nor, indeed, could any society have a viable system of I justice
if sanctions were abolished or ameliorated because most of those who commit
crimes happen to be underprivileged. The basic problem results not from the
penalties imposed for criminal conduct but from social and economic factors that
have plagued humanity since the beginning of recorded history, frustrating all ef-
forts to create i anyacountry at any time the perfect society in which there are
no "poor," no inorities" and no "underprivileged." Id. at 447 (footnote omit-
ted).
This is a misconception of the discriminatory impact argument. Justice Powell's
statement is that the disadvantaged have a higher rate of criminality than the more
affluent. But the discriminatory impact argument is that a black or poor murderer is
more likely to be executed than a white or rich murderer-not that a poor man or a
black is more likely to be a murderer. Chief Justice Burger understood this distinc-
tion: "eSitatistics suggest, at least as a historical matter, that Negroes have been sen-
tenced to death with greater frequency than whites in several States, particularly
for the crime of interracial rape." Id. at 389 n.12.
58. Id. at 245. This is a reference to the origin of the phrase "cruel and unusual
punishments" in the English Bill of Rights of 1689, from whence it came verbatim
to the Eighth Amendment Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted'
The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969). While Justice Douglas re-
lied heavily on Mr. Granucci's article, that source does not lend support to the Justice's
interpretation of the meaning of "cruel and unusual punishments" in the English Bill
of Rights. Indeed, Mr. Granucci's thesis was that
[tlhe English evidence shows that the cruel and unusual punishments clause of
the Bill of Rights of 1689 was first, an objection to imposition of punishments ...
unauthorized by statute . . . and second, a reiteration of the English policy against
disproportionate penalties. Id. at 860.
It would seem that Justice Douglas misread Granucci, upon whose article he based his
conclusion that the English Bill of Rights was "concerned primarily with selective
or irregular application of harsh penalties and that its aim was to forbid arbitrary and
discriminatory penalties of a severe nature." 408 U.S. at 242 (footnote omitted and
emphasis added).
Chief Justice Burger sought to rebut Justice Douglas by showing that the latter's in-
terpretation of the English Bill of Rights ignored history.
iThe history of capital punishment in England dramatically reveals that no pre-
mium was placed on equal justice for all, either before or after the Bill of Rights in
1689. From the time of Richard I until 1826 the death penalty was authorized in
England for treason and all felonies except larceny and mayhem, with the further
exception that persons entitled to benefit of clergy were subject to no penalty or
at most a very lenient penalty upon the commission of a felony. Benefit of clergy
grew out of the exemption of the clergy from the jurisdiction of the lay courts.
The exemption expanded to include assistants to clergymen, and by 1689, any
male who could read. Although by 1689 numerous felonies had been deemed
"nonclergyable," the disparity in punishments imposed on the educated and non-
educated remained for most felonies until the early 18th century. Id. at 376-77 n.2.
NOTES
[T]hese discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation.
They are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an in-
gredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws
that is implicit in the ban on "cruel and unusual punishments." 59
This holding is a commingling of the Eighth Amendment with Section
One of the Fourteenth Amendment. 0 While Justice Douglas argued
that either the Due Process Clause or the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment banned cruel and unusual punish-
ments,61 he based his opinion upon the belief "that the basic theme
of equal protection is implicit in 'cruel and unusual' punishments. 62
Chief Justice Burger refused to legitimize the equal protection
language of Justice Douglas, asserting that the latter avoided the true
Eighth Amendment issues before the Court.63  He contended that the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause bars certain state-imposed
penalties, not the methods by which judges and juries act to cause the
imposition of those penalties.
The Eighth Amendment was included in the Bill of Rights to assure
that certain types of punishnient would never be imposed, not to chan-
nelize the sentencing process. The approach of these concurring
opinions has no antecedent in the Eighth Amendment cases. It is es-
sentially and exclusively a procedural due process argument. 64
There can be no doubt that the arbitrariness-discrimination argu-
ment looks not at the death penalty itself, but at a sentencing proc-
ess which leaves the choice between death and a lesser punishment
to the unguided discretion of jurors.65 Perhaps the desire to dress this
59. 408 U.S. at 256-57.
60. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
61. 408 U.S. at 241.
62. Id. at 249. See note 58 supra.
63. 408 U.S. at 399. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
64. 408 U.S. at 399.
65. This was specifically recognized in the opinions of the four members of the
majority who addressed themselves to this issue:
Justice Brennan: "[O]ur procedures are not constructed to guard against the to-
tally capricious selection of criminals for the punishment of death." Id. at 295.
Justice Douglas: "[MW]e know that the discretion of judges and juries in imposing
the death penalty enables the penalty to be selectively applied, feeding prejudices
against the accused if he is poor and despised, and lacking political clout, or if
he is a member of a suspect or unpopular minority, and saving those who ...
may be in a more protected position." Id. at 255.
Justice Stewart: "I simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that per-
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essentially Fourteenth Amendment issue in Eighth Amendment garb can
be explained by the 1971 precedent of McGautha v. California,0
wherein the Court had granted certiorari limited to the question:
Does California's practice of allowing capital trial juries absolute dis-
cretion, uncontrolled by standards or directions of any kind, to impose
the death penalty upon a defendant convicted of the crine of murder
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.07
Justice Harlan, writing for a six man majority which included the
Chief Justice and Justices Black, Stewart, White, and Blackmun, had
answered the question in clear terms:
In light of history, experience, and the present limitations of human
knowledge, we find it quite impossible to say that committing to the
untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or death
in capital cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution. 8
In spite of attempts to develop a definition of "cruel and unusual
punishments" wide enough to embrace sentencing proceduies " and
thus to distinguish McGautha,r° the fact remains that the opinions of
mit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed." Id. at 310.
Justice White: "ITjhe policy of vesting sentencing authority primarily in juries
-a decision largely motivated by the desire to mitigate the harshness of the
law . . . has so effectively achieved its aims that capital punishment within the
confines of the statutes now before us has for all practical purposes run its
course." Id. at 313.
66. 402U.S. 183 (1971).
67. 398 U.S. 936 (1970).
68. 402 U.S. at 207.
69. 408 U.S. at 275-77. Justice Brennan traced the genesis of a "cruel and unusual"
analysis of sentencing procedures to the Court's treatment of the military use of firing
squads where the Court concluded that since the death penalty was invoked "in the
great majority of cases" where it was available, it could not be classified as "cruel
and unusual." Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 133-34 (1878). He also re-
called the Court's examination of the practices of other jurisdictions to see if
the punishment of denationalization was "'something different from that which is
generally done.'" 408 U.S. at 276, quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 n.32
(1958). See notes 19-23 supra and accompanying text.
He interpreted these precedents as an indication of the Court's recognition that
as the frequency of a punishment declines, the likelihood increases that its increasingly
rare imposition is arbitrary. 408 U.S. at 276-77. In their original context, how-
ever, this method of comparison was used to determine if the punishment was un-
usual or if it violated "evolving standards of decency." Justice Brennan's fashioning
of these cases into an anti-arbitrariness argument was a vital part of his effort to dem-
onstrate that an arbitrarily imposed punishment is an "unusual" one within the mean-
ing of the Eighth Amendment.
70. Justice Stewart maintained that
[iln McGautha v. California . . . the Court dealt with claims under the Due Pro-
cess and the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. We expressly
declined in that case to consider claims under the constitutional guarantee
against cruel and unusual punishments. 408 U.S. at 310 n.12 (citation omitted).
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three members of the Furman majority were restricted to the same
procedures upheld in McGautha. Justice Douglas warned that man-
datory death penalties would be unconstitutional if discriminatorily en-
forced, but specifically declined to consider whether they would be
otherwise unconstitutional. 7 1  Justice Stewart, specifically exempting
from his consideration four statutes providing for a mandatory death
penalty,7 2 chose not to judge the unconstitutionality "of capital punish-
ment in the abstract" but only under the procedures by which the pe-
titioners had been sentenced to death. 73 Justice White confined his
consideration to the "narrower" consideration of discretionary pun-
ishments because
[t]he facial constitutionality of statutes requiring the imposition of
the death penalty for first-degree murder, for more narrowly de-
fined categories of murder, or for rape would present quite different
issues . . therefore, I do not at all intimate that the death penalty is
unconstitutional per se or that there is no system of capital punish-
ment that would comport with the Eighth Amendment.
74
While the Furman grant of certiorari was expressed in Eighth
Amendment terminology, 75 and the McGautha grant of certiorari con-
fined itself to Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause questions,76
it is difficult to recognize any other basis by which to distinguish the
cases. McGautha permitted the discretionary imposition of the death
penalty by juries. 7 Furman ended the practice.78
In spite of Furman's similarity, the Chief Justice may not have been
wholly correct when he stated, "it would be disingenuous to suggest
71. "Whether a mandatory death penalty would otherwise be constitutional is a
question I do not reach." Id. at 257.
72. Id. at 307. 10 U.S.C. § 906 (1970) provides for execution of anyone acting as
a spy in wartime. RHODE IsLAND GEN. LAws ANN. § 11-23-2 requires the death
penalty for murder by a life term prisoner. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 2 re-
quires the death penalty for one convicted of murder in the commission of a forcible
rape. OHio Rnv. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §§ 2901.09, 2901.10 requires imposition of the
death penalty for the assassination of the President of the United States, any person in
line of succession to the Presidency, or the Governor or Lieutenant Governor of a State.
73. 408 U.S. at 308-09.
74. Id. at 310-11.
75. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
76. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
77. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
78. While Furman is popularly believed to have declared the death penalty uncon-
stitutional, only Justices Brennnan and Marshall would have gone so far. See note 13
supra and accompanying text. Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White explicitly declined
to rule on the constitutionality of the death penalty per se. See notes 71-74 supra and
accompanying text.
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that today's ruling has done anything less than overrule McGautha in
the guise of an Eighth Amendment adjudication. ''r a McGautha re-
jected a claim that jury instructions, incorporating standards to be
applied in capital sentencing, were required by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment not only because the formulation of such standards would be
difficult and a potential magnet for multitudinous appeals in capital
and non-capital cases, but also because it was felt that the formulation
of standards would have little impact. On the other hand, read in the
light of McGautha, Furman holds that with or without standards
the discretionary imposition of the death penalty could not pass con-
stitutional scrutiny. The votes of Justices Stewart and White were
determinative of the result in each case and the interest of both Jus-
tices in the elimination of arbitrary sentencing without further burden-
ing the Court may explain the results reached by each.80
Justices Brennan and Douglas, having dissented in McGautha,8 '
did not shrink from renewed confrontation with it. Justice Douglas
saw the Court as "imprisoned" in McGautha and felt that case contained
the "seeds" of Furman.82  Any "tension between our decision today
and McGauthd' was viewed as highlighting "the correctness of Justice
Brennan's dissent in that case,"-a dissent which Justice Douglas had
previously joined. 3 Justice Brennan noted that
our procedures in death cases . . . actually sanction an arbitrary selec-
tion. For this Court has held that juries may, as they do, make the de-
cision whether to impose a death sentence wholly unguided by stand-
ards governing that decision. [Citing McGautha.] In other words,
79. 408 U.S. at 400.
80. McGautha was decided by a 6-3 margin, Furman by a 5-4 vote. 402 U.S. at
184; 408 U.S. at 240. Neither Justice gave any rationale for his seemingly inconsis-
tent voting.
If the Furman result is to be viewed as other than a rejection of McGautha, it must
be upon the basis that neither case requires the states or the Court to devise intricate
schemes and verbal formulae for guiding jurors in selecting an appropriate penalty
in a capital case. Under Furman those states desirous of maintaining a death penalty
have far greater freedom than an opposite result in McGautha would have produced.
Assuming that it was the intention of Justices White and Stewart to strike down a
sentencing procedure they regarded as arbitrarily and freakishly imposed, Furman ar-
guably accomplishes this result without doing away entirely with the death penalty
and without burdening the courts with analyses of whether the penalty instructions of
a given trial judge have met some arbitrary set of rules established by the Supreme
Court. Had McGautha been decided as its dissenters had wished, the Court would most
likely have been engulfed by petitions requesting clarification of whatever capital sen-
tencing standards that opinion would have imposed.
81. 402 U.S. at 226, 248.
82. 408 U.S. at 248.
83. Id. n. 11.
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our procedures are not constructed to guard against the totally capri-
cious selection of criminals for the punishment of death.
84
Justice White who had concurred in McGautha,s5 chose to ignore
the McGautha rationale in Furman. Although he specifically voted in
Furman to end the same procedures he had voted to uphold in Mc-
Gautha,8 6 he felt no compulsion to try to distinguish McGautha or
even to comment on it. Perhaps Justice White felt that his addition of
another factor brought his opinion out of McGautha's shadow:
[C]ommon sense and experience tell us that seldom-enforced laws be-
come ineffective measures for controlling human conduct and that the
death penalty, unless imposed with sufficient frequency, will make lit-
tle contribution to deterring those crimes for which it may be exacted.87
This analysis-that a punishment is cruel and unusual if it is pur-
poseless-is similar to another of Justice Brennan's four principles.
C. Lack of Necessity
A punishment is excessive . . . if it is unnecessary: The infliction of
a severe punishment by the State cannot comport with human dignity
when it is nothing more than the pointless infliction of suffering. If
there is a significantly less severe punishment adequate to achieve the
purposes for which the punishment is inflicted . . . the punishment
inflicted is unnecessary and therefore excessive.
88
This principle, relied upon only by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
was viewed by them as having its genesis in Justice Field's dissent
84. Id. at 294-95.
85. 402 U.S. at 184.
86. See text accompanying notes 67-68 and 74 supra.
87. 408 U.S. at 312. This is a novel approach. The death penalty is unconstitu-
tionally cruel and unusual because it is imposed too infrequently. It would presum-
ably follow that increased use of the death penalty would restore its constitution-
ality. One wonders if Justice White would have favored retention of an arbitrary
but frequently imposed penalty. The Chief Justice observed that "[t]he implications
of this approach are mildly ironical." Id. at 398. For another interpretation of Jus-
tice White's view, see note 80 supra.
88. Id. at 279. Justice Brennan's use of "severe" here should not to be confused
with his first category of "unusual severity." See notes 29-35 supra and accompany-
ing text. The Justice was concerned there with punishments so unspeakably harsh
in their mental or physical impact as to be completely inconsistent with a regard for
human dignity. Here the concept is that the punishment may not be any more se-
vere than is necessary to accomplish its purpose. A greater punishment may not be
employed when a lesser one would serve as well.
For example, if the purpose of the punishment is considered the prevention of re-
cidivism, the death penalty is suspect under the unusual severity test because kill-
ing a man is utterly inconsistent with a due regard for his human dignity. It is im-
permissible under the lack of necessity test because the prevention of repeated offenses
can be as well accomplished by life imprisonment as by execution.
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in O'Neil v. Vermont,89 in which the Court considered Vermont's im-
position of a separate $20 fine for each of 307 illegal whiskey sales."
Justice Field not only disagreed with the majority's holding that the Court
lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter,91 but also opined that the
fines violated the Constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments. The Justice argued that:
The inhibition is directed . . . against all punishments which by their
excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses
charged. The whole inhibition is against that which is excessive either
in the bail required, or fine imposed, or punishment inflicted. 92
Justices Brennan and Marshall further buttressed their position by
drawing support from Weems v. United States.93 The Court there had
adopted Justice Field's O'Neil test to find a punishment of fifteen years
at hard and painful labor in irons and forfeiture of civil and familial
rights to be cruel and unusual, in that it was disproportionate to the
crime of a falsifying a public document.94 The Court catalogued more
serious crimes that were less severely punished, 95 especially contrast-
ing the severity of Weems' punishment to the relatively lenient sentence
imposed for the far more serious crime of counterfeiting.9" The con-
trast rendered Weems' sentence excessive and therefore cruel and un-
usual:
In other words, the highest punishment possible for a crime which may
cause the loss of many thousand of dollars, and to prevent which the
duty of the State should be as eager as to prevent the perversion of
truth in a public document, is not greater than that which may be im-
posed for falsifying a single item of a public account. And this con-
89. 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
90. Id. at 325-30.
91. Id. at 337. Justice Field argued that since the whiskey in question was imported
from New York to Vermont, the transactions were within the definition of interstate
commerce and hence subject to federal regulation. Id. at 347-49.
92. Id. at 339-40. Justice Field's basis for arguing that the Eighth Amendment should
have been applied to the punishments imposed by one of the states is unclear. It is
certain, however, that the Court has held the Eighth Amendment applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth. Robinson v. '(alifomia, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962). See note
31 supra.
93. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
94. Id. at 362-65, 371.
95. Included were some degrees of homicide, inciting rebellion, misprision of trea-
son, conspiracy to destroy the government by force, and recruiting soldiers in the
United States to fight against the United States. Id. at 380.
96. "lt is provided that the forgery of or counterfeiting the obligations or
securities of the United States or of the Philippine Islands shall be punished by a fine
of not more than ten thousand pesos and by imprisonment of not more than fifteen
years." Id. at 380-81.
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trast shows more than different exercises of legislative judgment. It
is greater than that. It condemns the sentence in this case as cruel
and unusual. It exhibits a difference between unrestrained power
and that which is exercised under the spirit of constitutional limita-
tions formed to establish justice. The State thereby suffers nothing
and loses no power. The purpose of punishment is fulfilled, crime
is repressed by penalties of just, not tormenting, severity, its repetition
is prevented, and hope is given for the reformation of the criminal. 97
Justices Brennan and Marshall interpreted these cases to indicate, in
Justice Brennan's words, that:
If there is a significantly less severe punishment adequate to achieve
the purposes for which the punishment is inflicted . . . the pun-
ishment inflicted is unnecessary and therefore excessive. . . . Al-
though the determination that a severe punishment is excessive may be
grounded in a judgment that it is disproportionate to the crime, the
more significant basis is that the punishment serves no penal purpose
more effectively than a less severe punishment. This view of the prin-
ciple was explicitly recognized by the Court in Weems v. United States
98
This interpretation of the Weems doctrine is questionable. Justice
Brennan's words indicate the transmutation of a test of excessiveness
into one of lack of necessity. The excessiveness test, as developed in
the O'Neil dissent and the Weems opinion, suggested a balancing test
between the seriousness of the crime and the severity of the punish-
ment. The argument adduced in those opinions was that the punish-
ments of the multiplication of fines for whiskey sales and fifteen years
at hard labor in chains for the offense of falsifying a government rec-
ord were excessive in that they were disproportionately severe when
compared to the crime for which they were imposed.99 Justice Bren-
nan's words indicate a different test, one which evaluates a punish-
ment in view of its purpose rather than by a comparison to the seri-
97. Id. at 381. This is an example of the basis for Justice Brennan's "cumulative"
test. See notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text. The Weems Court primarily ob-
jected to the punishment as unnecessary ("The purpose of punishment is fulfilled
• . .") but there are also hints of arbitrariness and unusual severity in a punishment
which is greater than the punishments imposed for lesser crimes.
98. 408 U.S. at 279-80 (emphasis added). See also Justice Marshall's similar state-
ment of this view. Id. at 331-32.
99. See notes 88-96 supra and accompanying text. Had Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall approached the death penalty under the traditional excessiveness test, they would
have been forced to hold the death penalty disproportionately severe for the crimes
of murder and rape. Such an argument was in fact urged upon the Court by petitioners
Branch and Jackson, convicted of rape, and was discussed and rejected by Justice
Powell. 408 U.S. at 456-61.
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ousness of the crime. This new test of lack of necessity was seen by
the Furman dissenters as a "gross distortion" of the excessiveness
doctrine0 0 and as a substitution of notions of "social utility" and "en-
lightened principles of penology" for the "intractable" standard of
cruelty seen by the dissenters as the essence of the Eighth Amend-
ment.' 0o
Justices Brennan and Marshall brushed aside such objections to
examine the lack of necessity of the death penalty to accomplish its
purposes of retribution and deterrence. 102 The legitimacy of the
purpose of retribution-the notion that, in Justice Brennan's words,
"criminals are put to death because they deserve it"'0 -is, of course,
a philosophical and moral question. Justice Brennan attempted to
make it also a constitutional one by injecting it into his definition of lack
of necessity:
As administered today . . . the punishment of death cannot be justi-
fied as a fecessary means of exacting retribution from criminals. When
100. 408 U.S. at 392.
101. Id. at 394.
102. Justice Marshall also examined the purposes of the prevention of recidivism,
the encouragement of guilty pleas and confessions, eugenics, and the reduction of
state expenditures.
The Justice argued that the death penalty is unnecessary to prevent recidivism
because murderers do not tend to be recidivists. "For the most part, they are first of-
fenders, and when released from prison they are known to become model citizens."
Id. at 355. See SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY, A REPORT FOR THE MODEL PENAL
CODE PROJECT OF THE AiMRmcAN LAW INSTTrUTE 73-79 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
Sellin gave as an example the 342 California male prisoners paroled between 1945-
1954 after convictions for first degree murder. By June of 1956, only 37 of them
had violated parole, a percentage of 10.8. The percentages for parolees in other
categories during the period from 1946-1949 were: robbery, 20.8%, burglary, 25.6%,
forgery, 30.2%, and automobile theft, 31.1%. Id. at 77. Justice Marshall also argued
that jurors are never asked to consider the prevention of recidivism as a basis for impos-
ing the death penalty. Even if they were, he added, the death penalty would still be
excessive without a showing of the need to exterminate all capital offenders or a specific
individual. 408 U.S. at 355.
The use of the death penalty to encourage guilty pleas and confessions was rejected
as unconstitutionally infringing upon a defendant's right to a jury trial. Furthermore,
such use is inconsistent with a view of the death penalty as a punishment. Id. at 356-
57. "T]he history of the world does not look kindly upon" eugenic goals which the
Justice regards as "meritless." Certainly execution is unnecessary for such a goal, easily
accomplished by sterilization, treatment, or imprisonment. Id.
Execution cannot be justified as being fiscally less costly than imprisonment. The
comparatively low cost of execution is balanced by many factors, among which are
the prolonged and therefore more expensive trials incident to capital cases, the costs of
appeals and collateral attacks, and the verification of allegations of insanity. Id. at
357-58.
103. 408 U.S. at 304.
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the overwhelming number of criminals who commit capital crimes go
to prison, it cannot be concluded that death serves the purpose of ret-
ribution more effectively than imprisonment. The asserted public
belief that murderers and rapists deserve to die is flatly inconsistent
with the execution of a random few. 104
Within the parameters of Justice Brennan's definition of "excessive,"
a punishment is cruel and unusual "if there is a significantly less severe
punishment adequate to achieve the purposes for which the punish-
ment is inflicted." Yet, since most criminals who commit capital
crimes go to prison, it was clear to the Justice that imprisonment serves
whatever retributive purpose society requires.
While Justice Brennan impliedly approved of the retributive pur-
pose of punishments, 105 Justice Marshall approached retribution less
generously: "Punishment as retribution has been condemned by schol-
ars for centuries, and the Eighth Amendment itself was adopted
to prevent punishment from becoming synonymous with vengeance."' "
Marshall's argument was that if "retribution alone" is a permissible
goal of punishment, the ban on cruel and unusual punishments has
no meaning, for the severity of a punishment would then be dependent
upon the amount of public outrage prompted by the crime. Thus "a
return to the rack and other tortures would be possible in a given
case."
07
104. Id. at 304-05. Justice Brennan's personal dislike for "naked vengeance" was re-
vealed in the next sentence of the quotation: "[Olur society wishes to prevent
crime; we have no desire to kill criminals simply to get even with them." Id. at 305.
105. But see note 104 supra.
106. Id. at 343. While retribution has been attacked for centuries, there is a long-
standing and deeply held view to the contrary. See Vellenga, Christianity and the
Death Penalty, in BEDEAU, supra note 4, at 123-30. The Reverend Vellenga quoted
Genesis 9:4-6: "Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed; for
God made man in his own image." BEDEAu, supra note 4, at 124. Also quoted was
Numbers 35:30-34:
[Y]ou shall accept no ransom for the life of a murderer who is guilty of death;
but he shall be put to death .... You shall not thus pollute the land in which
you live; for blood pollutes the land, and no expiation can be made . . . except
by the blood of him who shed it. BEDEAu at 125.
107. 408 U.S. at 345. Justice Marshall's qualification of his attack on retribution
as an attack on "retribution alone" (emphasis added) prevented a conflict between his
Furman opinion and his opinion in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), where the
Court distinguished a Texas statute forbidding public drunkenness from the California
statute forbidding narcotics addiction struck down in Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962). See note 31 supra. The Justice had stated in Powell
that "[t]his Court has never held that anything in the Constitution requires that
penal sanctions be designed solely to achieve therapeutic or rehabilitative effects. .. ."
392 U.S. at 530 (emphasis added). Justice Marshall in Furman used the identical
language. 408 U.S. at 352.
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In addition to retribution, capital punishment is commonly justified
as a deterrent to crime. The argument is usually based on the assump-
tion that common knowledge and human experience demonstrate that
a man is more frightened of death than of imprisonment and hence will
be more deterred by the threat of execution than of imprisonment.108
Justice Brennan responded with a reductio ad absurdum approach.
The theory that criminal conduct is deterred by the threat of the death
penalty assumes a criminal who thinks rationally about his crimes-
so rationally that he not only considers the risk of punishment, but dis-
tinguishes between punishments so precisely that he will be willing
to risk life in prison but not death. The implausible assumption that
such criminals exist is further weakened when one considers that
the risk of death is remote,10  and that of imprisonment considerably
greater.1
10
Justice Marshall's argument was? empirical. If the death penalty
really is a deterrent, then murders should be less frequent in states
which have retained the death penalty than in those which have
abolished it, assuming socio-economic equality, and similar urban-rural
population ratios. 11 The Justice's extensive documentation indicates
that this proposition does not hold. In addition, neither abolition
nor reintroduction of the death penalty within a given state has led to a
significant change in that state's homicide rate." 2
Considerable disagreement remains on the Court as to the burden
of proof necessary to sustain the argument that the death penalty serves
no deterrent purpose. Justice Brennan stated that "the available evi-
108. 408 U.S. at 301, 347-48, 454-56. A typical statement of this view is Allen,
Capital Punishment: Your Protection and Mine in BEDAU, supra note 4, at 135-36:
Capital Punishment Does Not Deter Crime?
If this be true, then why do criminals, even the braggadocian Chessman type,
fear it most? Why does every criminal sentenced to death seek commutation to
life imprisonment? Common sense alone, without the benefit of knowledge, wis-
dom, and experience, convinces that we are influenced to the greatest degree by
that which we love, respect or fear to the greatest degree-and that we cling most
tenaciously to our most valued possessions. Life is indisputably our greatest pos-
session. Additionally, there is no definitive proof anywhere that the death pen-
alty is not a deterrent. There are merely the gratuitous statements of wishful
thinkers, some of whom, because of the responsible duties of their positions,
ought not be making unprovable or misleading statements.
109. See notes 41-45 supra and accompanying text.
110. 408 U.S. at 301-02.
111. Id. at 349.
112. In three appendices to his opinion Justice Marshall contrasted abolitionist
states with similar states that retained the death penalty. The crude homicide death
rates per 100,000 people over the period from 1920-1955 showed no significant vari-
ance between similar abolitionist and retentionist states. Id. at 372-74.
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dence uniformly indicates, although it does not conclusively prove"113
that death is not a superior deterrent. Justice Marshall felt that
[d]espite the fact that abolitionists have not proved non-deterrence
beyond a reasonable doubt, they have succeeded in showing by clear
and convincing evidence that capital punishment is not necessary as
a deterrent to crime in our society. This is all that they must do. We
would shirk our judicial responsibilities if we failed to accept the pres-
ently existing statistics and demanded more proof. It may be that we
now possess all the proof that anyone could ever hope to assemble on
the subject. But, even if further proof were to be forthcoming, I be-
lieve there is more than enough evidence presently available for a
decision in this case."14
Justice Powell argued that such an approach conflicted with the
Court's traditional view that legislative enactments in the area of
fixing punishments are entitled to a presumption of validity.5 Hence
the burden of proof was upon the petitioners "to show that there exist
no justifications for the legislative enactments challenged."" 6 The
Chief Justice argued that to shift the burden of proof to the states was
but an "illusory solution." Such a shift in the burden of justification,
he maintained, could just as easily and logically be placed on the
states in the case of any punishment, thus requiring a state to be pre-
pared to support, for example, the superior deterrent effect of a $10
parking ticket over a $5 parking ticket.
7
But a reading of the language used by Justice Brennan and Mar-
shall does not indicate any such shift of the burden of proof. Rather
they speak of the quantum of proof involved and manifest a willing-
ness to consider some amount of proof less than "beyond a reasonable
doubt." Because a law is presumed valid does not necessarily mean
that the presumption need be rebutted by more than a preponderance
113. Id. at 301 (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 353. It must be remembered that the nature of the test of lack of neces-
sity required only that capital punishment be no better a deterrent than imprisonment.
See notes 88-101 supra and accompanying text.
115. Id. at 451, 456. Justice Powell cited Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349, 379 (1910)
as one example. The Weems court stated:
However, there is a certain subordination of the judiciary to the legislature. The
function of the legislature is primary, its exercises fortified by presumptions of
right and legality, and it is not to be interfered with lightly, nor by any judicial
conception of their wisdom or propriety.
116. 408 U.S. at 456.
117. Id. at 396. Justice Marshall answered this objection by maintaining that the
burden of demonstrating the excessiveness of the death penalty had taken 200 years
to sustain and that therefore "[t]he burden placed on those challenging capital punish-
ment could not have been greater." Id. at 360 n.141.
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of the evidence. Justices Marshall and Brennan evidently believed
petitioners had sustained the burden required of them. Whether or
not it was sustained is an issue on which rational men might differ,
but it is clear that the burden remained on the petitioners.
D. Moral Unacceptability
[S]evere punishment must not be unacceptable to contemporary so-
ciety. Rejection by society . . . is a strong indication that a severe
punishment does not comport with human dignity. 118
This principle was not challenged by the dissenters. But Chief Jus-
tice Burger and Justices Powell and Blackmun, noting that the laws
of forty states, the District of Columbia and the Federal Government con-
tinued to allow the death penalty,119 insisted that the most accurate
reflection of a society's attitudes toward a punishment was to be found
in the laws it enacted. 20  Justices Blackmun and Powell also noted that
many of these statutes had but recently been passed by resounding
majorities,' 2 ' and that in the last fourteen years the voters of three
states had voted to restore oi continue the death penalty.' 22  A final
argument was that juries, which presumably express "the conscience
of the community"' 23 continued to impose the death penalty at the rate
of twice a week. 1
24
118. Id. at 277. The most recent previous expression of this test was in Chief Jus-
tice Warren's opinion in Trop v. Dulles, holding that the definition of a cruel and un-
usual punishment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society," 356 U.S. at 101. See also text accompany.
ing notes 19-23 supra.
119. See notes 3-4 supra.
120. 408 U.S. at 383-84, 411-13, 437-39.
121. The strong backing of statutes providing for capital penalties is clearly reflected
in federal legislation. In 1961 Congress passed the aircraft piracy bill 92-0 in the Sen-
ate and by voice vote in the House. In 1965 Congress approved the presidential
assassination statute by voice vote. The Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, providing
the death penalty for congressional assassination, was approved 341-26 in the House
and 59-0 in the Senate. 408 U.S. at 412-13, 437.
122. In Colorado 65% of the voters approved the death penalty in 1966. In 1968 the
people of Massachusetts recommended retention of the death penalty. 64% of Illinois
voters approved the penalty as recently as 1970. 408 U.S. 438-39. On November 7,
1972, the voters of California opted to amend this state's Constitution to restore those
capital punishment provisions struck down by the California Supreme Court in People v.
Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958
(1972). See note 4 supra.
123. See note 52 supra.
124. 408 U.S. at 441. It is interesting to note that both Justice Powell in dissent and
Justice Brennan for the majority cited the actions of juries to support their arguments.
The former argued that the fact jurors impose the death penalty as often as twice a
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While announcing his search for "objective indicators" by which to
measure society's attitude toward the death penalty, Justice Brennan
rejected these arguments grounded on voter approval because, "[t]he
acceptability of a severe punishment is measured, not by its availability,
for it might become so offensive to society as never to be inflicted, but
by its use."' 25 Society's debate over the morality of the death penalty
26
has caused progressive restriction of methods of execution, 27 rejection
of public executions "as debasing and brutalizing to us all,"' 28 and a
drastic reduction of the number of crimes for which death may be
imposed. 12  The Justice also saw society's concern over the death
penalty reflected in the reluctance of governors and the appellate judici-
ary to actually let a condemned criminal be executed.'3 0 These "ob-
jective indicators" of society's attitudes led Justice Brennan to conclude
that "today society will inflict death upon only a small sample of the
eligible criminals. Rejection could hardly be more complete without
becoming absolute.'
3 '
Justice Marshall's manner of ascertaining his fellow citizens' views of
the death penalty was somewhat novel. He maintained that there
was really no accurate means to determine what the people actually
think.'32 Even if the present views of the American populace could be
defined, however,
the question with which we must deal is not whether a substantial pro-
portion of American citizens would today, if polled, opine that capital
punishment is barbarously cruel, but whether they would find it to be
so in the light of all information presently available.' 33
Justice Marshall thus concluded that a majority of society would
opt for his position if it could peruse the data he had amassed. He
week shows that there is still considerable popular support for the death penalty. Id.
The latter argued that the fact jurors impose the death penalty as seldom as they do in-
dicates a nearly absolute rejection. Id. at 300.
125. Id. at 278-79.
126. Justice Brennan stated, "[t]he country has debated whether a society for which
the dignity of the individual is the supreme value can, without a fundamental incon-
sistency, follow the practice of deliberately putting some of its members to death." Id.
at 296.
127. Hanging and shooting have given way to the "supposedly more humane meth-
ods" of electrocution and gassing. Id. at 296-97.
128. Id. at 297.
129. Id. Murder and rape have recently accounted for nearly 99% of all executions.
130. Id. at 299.
131. Id. at 300.
132. The community attitude "'resembles a slithery shadow, since one can seldom
learn, at all accurately, what the community, or a majority, actually feels.' "Id. at 361.
133. 408 U.S. at 362.
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justified this view by asserting that
[j]udges have not lived lives isolated from a broad range of human ex-
perience. . . . They have learned to share with their fellow human
beings common views of morality. If, after drawing on this experi-
ence and considering the vast range of people and views that they have
encountered, judges conclude that these people would not knowingly
tolerate a specific penalty in light of its costs, then this conclusion is en-
titled to weight. 1
34
The "costs" of the death penalty, as compiled by the Justice, do have
great persuasive weight. The death penalty is not a credible deter-
rent;13 5 murderers are very rarely executed, 30 are often model prison-
ers, and are rarely recidivists;137 the penalty is discriminatorily applied
against blacks, 138 the poor, the ignorant, the underprivileged139 and by
sex;140 innocent men are executed; 141 the death penalty distorts and
134. Id. at 369-70 n.163 (citation omitted). This startling method of analysis per-
haps is owed to Goldberg and Dershowitz who, in analyzing the Court's opinion in
Robinson v. California concluded that in Robinson
the Court reasoned that narcotics addition [sic] is a disease like mental illness or
leprosy, and that in the light of contemporary human knowledge, a law which
made a criminal offense of such a disease would doubtless be universally thought
to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
The Court did not say that general public opinion actually did condemn the
imposition of criminal penalties for narcotics addiction. Rather, it said that the
public, if fully informed, would condemn it. In other words, the Court looked not
to actual standards of decency prevailing in society, but to enlightened standards.
The Robinson approach to the evolving standards of decency is suggestive of the
unconstitutionality of the death penalty. Were capital punishment, like crimi-
nal punishment of narcotic addiction, better understood, prevailing moral standards
might well condemn it. Goldberg and Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty
Unconstitutional, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1773, 1783 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
But Goldberg and Dershowitz merely suggested that the Court look "not to actual
standards of decency prevailing in society, but to enlightened standards." Justice
Marshall perhaps distorted this view by positing that these enlightened standards the
Court has developed are the actual standards, on the theory that they are the norms
the public would share if it but knew what the Court knows.
135. 408 U.S. at 362. See also notes 108-14 supra and accompanying text.
136. Id. at 362-63. See also notes 41-47 supra and accompanying text.
137. Id. at 363.
138. Id. at 364. Of 3,859 executed since 1930, 1,751 were white and 2,066 were
black. Of the 455 executions for rape, 405 were blacks.
139. Id. at 365-66. Justice Marshall argued that the poor are less likely to be well
defended. "Their impotence leaves them victims of a sanction that the wealthier, bet-
ter-represented, just-as-guilty person can escape." Id. at 366.
140. Id. at 365. Only thirty-two women have been executed since 1930, compared to
3,827 men.
141. Id. at 367-68. As Justice Marshall remarked:
[N]o matter how careful courts are, the possibility of perjured testimony, mistaken
honest testimony, and human error remain all too real. We have no way of
judging how many innocent persons have been executed but we can be certain that
there were some. (footnote omitted.)
NOTES
sensationalizes the entire criminal process. 142
Excellent as these arguments may be, they are hardly a reliable indi-
cator of people's thoughts on capital punishement. The opinions of
judges are indeed "entitled to weight," but it is questionable whether
judicial assumptions as to the probable opinions of an informed and
enlightened American people should outweigh the easily verifiable ac-
tions of forty state legislatures, the Congress of the United States, and at
least four recent popular referenda. 4 The considerations of Justice
Marshall are sufficiently common that it is dubious to imply that they
escaped the notice of the deliberative proceedings of the entire nation.
iH
THE MINORITY PERSPECTIVE
Cases such as these provide for me an excruciating agony of the spirit.
I yield to no one in the depth of my distaste, antipathy, and, indeed,
abhorrence, for the death penalty, with all its aspects of physical dis-
tress and fear and of moral judgment exercised by finite minds. That
distaste is buttressed by a belief that capital punishment serves no
useful purpose that can be demonstrated. For me, it violates child-
hood's training and life's experiences, and is not compatible with the
philosophical convictions I have been able to develop. It is antagonistic
to any sense of "reverence for life." Were I a legislator, I would vote
against the death penalty for the policy reasons argued by counsel for
the respective petitioners and expressed and adopted in the several
opinions filed by the Justices who vote to reverse these convictions.' 44
These words, as eloquent and impassioned as any in the majority
opinion, introduced the dissent of Justice Blackmun. Chief Justice
Burger'45 and Justice Powell' 4 joined in expressing a personal dislike for
the death penalty. Yet all of the dissenters felt unable to translate
their personal beliefs into a constitutional prohibition.
142. Id. at 368. Former Justice Frankfurter expressed a similar view:
I am strongly against capital punishment .... When life is at hazard in a trial,
it sensationalizes the whole thing almost unwittingly; the effect on juries, the Bar,
the public, the Judiciary, I regard as very bad. I think scientifically the claim of
deterrence is not worth much. Whatever proof there may be in my judgment
does not outweigh the social loss due to the inherent sensationalism of a trial for
life. F. FRANKFuRTER, OF LAW AND MEN 81 (1956).
143. See notes 121-22 supra.
144. 408 U.S. at 405-06.
145. Id. at 375.
146. Id. at 465. While Justice Powell did not explicitly condemn the death pen-
alty, he did decry "the failure of some legislative bodies to address the capital punish-
ment issue with greater frankness or effectiveness." Id.
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The cornerstone of the minority's reluctance to invalidate the death
penalty was the doctrine of judicial restraint. The dissenters felt that,
regardless of the strength of their views, they must manifest what
Justice Powell described as "a proper recognition of the respective
roles of the legislative and judicial branches" respecting crime and
punishment:
The designation of punishments for crimes is a matter peculiarly within
the sphere of the state and federal legislative bodies. When asked to
encroach on the legislative prerogative we are well counseled to pro-
ceed with the utmost reticence. The review of legislative choices, in
the performance of our duty to enforce the Constitution, has been char-
acterized most appropriately by Mr. Justice Holmes as "the gravest and
most delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform.'
4 7
It is easy to glibly brush aside such reticence as an excuse for inac-
tion,148 but the dissenters did not argue that a legislatively enacted
punishment cannot be unconstitutional. Their point was simply that
such enactments are presumed constitutional and that a strong show-
hag of unconstitutionality must be made before that presumption may
be overcome.149 The dissenters thought the majority's views were
difficult to square with the implicit constitutional acceptance of the
death penalty in the Fifth Amendment 80 and a body of case law ac-
cepting the constitutional validity of capital punishment.' 5 '
Justice Powell argued that the Framers could not have intended
the Eighth Amendment as a ban on the death penalty since the Fifth
Amendment, enacted at the same time as the Eighth, guaranteed
those charged with crimes that the prosecution would have only a single
opportunity to seek imposition of the death penalty and that the death
penalty could not be exacted without due process and a grand jury
147. Id. at 431 (citation omitted).
148. Such an approach was taken by Justice White:
Judicial review, by definition, often involves a conflict between judicial and
legislative judgment as to what the Constitution means or requires. In this respect,
Eighth Amendment cases come to us in no different posture. It seems conceded by
all that the Amendment imposes some obligation on the judiciary to judge the con-
stitutionality of punishments and that there are punishments that the Amendment
would bar whether legislatively approved or not. Id. at 313-14.
149. See text accompanying note 147 supra.
150. The Fifth Amendment provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, un-
less on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War
or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).




Therefore the Eighth Amendment's ban of cruel and unusual punish-
ment was to be interpreted as forbidding some punishments, but not
death. 
53
The dissenters recognized that the death penalty had also been es-
tablished by a long line of cases endorsing or necessarily assuming its
constitutional validity. Wilkerson v. Utah,' In re Kemmler,'55 and
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,156 which denied challenges to
the manner or mode of inflicting the death penalty, must be read as
upholding capital punishment, since it would be nonsense to hold that
there is a constitutional manner of inflicting an unconstitutional pun-
ishment.1
5 7
152. Id. at 419.
153. Justices Brennan and Marshall did not disagree with this interpretation of the
Framers' intent, although they emphasized the idea that the Clause had been inserted
into the Bill of Rights as a judicial check on legislative power. See the remarks of
Patrick Henry, quoted by Justice Brennan (id. at 259-60), and by Justice Marshall. Id.
at 320-21. Such an approach gives little attention to the fact that the contents of
Henry's remarks indicated that this check was to be used in the event the legislature
should enact a punishment involving torture, rather than death alone.
Justice Brennan attached great significance to the remarks of Representative Liver-
more at the First Congress. Livermore objected to the proposed Eighth Amendment
on the grounds that
it is sometimes necessary to hang a man, villains often deserve whipping, and
perhaps having their ears cut off; but are we in future to be prevented from inflict-
ing these punishments because they are cruel? Id. at 262.
From the Congress' disregard of Livermore's protest, Justice Brennan concluded that
the Framers were prepared to run the risk that common punishments such as death
by hanging would one day be overruled. He did not mention that it is at least
equally possible that the Congress thought these fears so unfounded as to not even de-
serve a reply.
154. 99 U.S. 130 (1878). In upholding the constitutionality of Utah's practice of
vesting in the trial court the power to determine whether a murderer should be shot
or hanged, the Court interpreted the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to be pri-
marily concerned with torture. Id. at 135-36.
155. 136 U.S. 436 (1890). In determining that electrocution was not cruel and
unusual, since it was more "humane" than the methods of execution it replaced, the
Court said:
Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the
Constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more
than the mere extinguishment of life. Id. at 447.
156. 329 U.S. 459 (1947). See also note 30 supra. In Resweber, the Court up-
held, as against Eighth Amendment attack, the subjection of a petitioner to death by
electrocution after an earlier attempt to electrocute him had failed. Speaking for the
Court, Justice Reed stated:
The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty in-
herent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any
method employed to extinguish life humanely. Id. at 464.
157. 408 U.S. at 377-79, 407, 421-24. Justice Brennan's response to these cases
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The thrust of the historical view upholding the constitutional valid-
ity of capital punishment is most forcefully presented in Trop v. Dulles:
At the outset, let us put to one side the death penalty as an index of
the constitutional limit on punishment. Whatever the arguments
may be against capital punishment, both on moral grounds and in terms
of accomplishing the purposes of punishment-and they are force-
ful-the death penalty has been employed throughout our history,
and, in a day when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to vio-
late the constitutional concept of cruelty.
158
The recent cases of Witherspoon v. Illinois5" and McGautha v. Cali-
fornia,"6 ° which evaluated certain procedural requirements in capital
trials, had been "singularly academic exercises," according to Justice
Powell, if they were but prefatory to the invalidation of the death pen-
alty. 61 The basic posture of the minority, then, was that the Constitu-
tion did oblige the Court to determine if a particular punishment was
cruel and unusual, but that the determination must be made in the con-
text of affirmative references to capital punishment in the Constitu-
tion, case law approving the death penalty, and the obligation of the
judiciary to restrain itself from interference with the legislative power
to determine punishments.
,The members of the minority recognized only two tests by which a
punishment could be found unconstitutionally cruel and unusual. They
would strike down a punishment as excessive for a given crime- "
was to view them as exemplifying the "'historical' interpretation" of the Eighth
Amendment which he contrasted with his own interpretation of the Cruel and Un-
usual Punishments Clause as a "restraint upon legislatures." Id. at 265-69.
158. 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1957).
159. 391 U.S. 510 (1968). The Court held that the practice of challenging jurors for
cause because they objected to or stated doubts about the validity or propriety of
the death penalty in capital trials deprived defendants of the impartial jury to which
they were entitled under the Sixth Amendment.
160. 402 U.S. 183 (1971). The Furman dissenters argued that McGautha fore-
closed a consideration of the arbitrary aspects of the death penalty. See notes 66-80
supra and accompanying text. They further urged that Witherspoon and MeGautha
foreclosed all consideration of the validity of the death penalty itself.
A consideration of the language of the two cases would at least call into doubt the
assertion that the Court foresaw the continued inevitability of the death penalty.
In Witherspoon Justice Stewart's majority opinion ended: "Whatever else might be
said of capital punishment, it is at least clear that its imposition by a hanging jury
cannot be squared with the Constitution." 391 U.S. at 523 (emphasis added). In
McGautha Justice Harlan noted that "it may well be that criteria for jury sentencing
discretion are superior means of dealing with capital cases if the death penalty is to be
retained at all." 402 U.S. at 220-21 (emphasis added).
161. 408 U.S. at 427 (footnote omitted).
162. See notes 99-100 supra and accompanying text.
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None of the Furman petitioners argued that the death penalty was
disproportionate to the crime of murder, and Justice Powell explicitly
rejected the argument that it was excessively severe for rape.163 The
dissenters would also invalidate a punishment which has become mor-
ally unacceptable to the American people,164 but they would not ignore
the plain and evident fact that the American people have not rejected
the death penalty. 165
The essence of the minority position was that no constitutional basis
existed for the members of the Court to impose their personal views
regarding the propriety of the death penalty on the states. It por-
trayed the majority, in the words of Justice Rehnquist, as yielding to
"the natural desire that beguiles judges along with other human beings
into imposing their own views of goodness, truth, and justice upon
others."166 Justices Powell and Blackmun saw the Court as indulging its
"personal preferences"'167 and "subjective standards of wise policy"1 68
at the expense of the judicial role. It is no wonder that Justice Black-
mun would argue that "[t]he Court has just decided that it is time to
strike down the death penalty"' 6 9 and that Justice Rehnquist would




Furman did not end the death penalty in America. It merely
ended a sentencing procedure by which juries were given an unguided,
unrestricted discretion to impose the death penalty or a lesser offense
for capital crimes. 7  It would seem therefore that a state law requir-
ing the death penalty for appropriate crimes would be upheld.
One year previously, the Court upheld the procedures similar to
those struck down in Furman; Justice Harlan's majority opinion in Mc-
Gautha v. California praised the replacement of common law manda-
tory death penalties with jury discretion as a humanizing development
163. 408 U.S. at 456-61.
164. See notes 118-24 supra and accompanying text.
165. Id.
166. 408 U.S. at 467.
167. Id. at 411.
168. Id. at 431.
169. Id. at 408.
170. Id. at 468.
171. See notes 37-40, 77-78 supra and accompanying text.
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in the law.'72 Furman ends that development. If any state should
wish to impose a death penalty for a crime, it must do so in a statute
that requires juries to choose between death and acquittal. This is a
most curious and grisly kind of progress.
Justices Brennan and Marshall alone voted to invalidate the death
penalty per se.' 7s Justice Brennan's opinion in particular afforded a
reasonable theoretical basis by which to strike down the death pen-
alty:
In sum, the punishment of death is inconsistent with all four prin-
ciples: Death is an unusually severe and degrading punishment; there
is a strong probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily; its rejection by
contemporary society is virtually total; and there is no reason to be-
lie've that it serves any penal purpose more effectively than the less se-
vere punishment of imprisonment. The function of these principles is
to enable a Court to determine whether a punishment comports with hu-
man dignity. Death, quite simply, does not.174
Justice Brennan believed that his cumulative test allowed him to de-
termine that the institution of the death penalty was inconsistent with
human dignity. Whatever problems 75 or unanswered questions ' "
this test presents, it does not leave Justice Brennan in an untenable
position. The same cannot be said of the opinions of Justices Stew-
art and White, who preferred the more difficult task of distinguish-
ing Furman from McGautha.
The members of the minority found themselves unable to translate
their personal objections to the death penalty into law. It is to be re-
gretted that not one of them addressed himself to the totality of Jus-
tice Brennan's tests. One wonders, for example, why Justice Black-
mun, who so forcefully expressed his "distaste, antipathy, and, in-
172. 402 U.S. at 199-201. Furman's effect may well be to hasten the end of capital
punishment entirely. Juries faced with a mandatory death statute might opt for acquit-
tal in many cases, thus encouraging a public reappraisal of the penalty in the terms
announced by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
173. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
174. 408 U.S. at 305.
175. See criticism of the tests of lack of necessity and moral unacceptability,
notes 98-101 and 119-24, 134 supra and accompanying text.
176. Suppose, for example, that the Court were to be presented with a challenge to a
mandatory death penalty, the imposition of which would not violate Furman. Presum-
ably such a penalty would not be arbitrary, thus avoiding one element of Justice Bren-
nan's four-part test. Would the three elements of unusual severity, lack of necessity,
and moral unacceptability be sufficient to invalidate a mandatory death penalty?
Even a mandatory death penalty might be shown to be imposed in a discriminatory
manner, thus presenting the equal protection issues raised by Justice Douglas.
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deed, abhorrence" for the death penalty, did not at least respond di-
rectly to Justice Brennan's tests, even if only to reject them.
A society's conception of human nature will determine that society's
system of law. Justice Brennan has insisted that it also determine our
system of punishment. No man can define human dignity, yet its ex-
istence is one of our oldest and most deeply held beliefs. Justice Bren-
nan has posited the intrinsic worth of every fragile human life, even
that of the most heinous of criminals. In doing so he is faithful to a vi-
sion of man far more ancient than that underlying the constitutional
doctrines before him:
When I behold your heavens, the work of your fingers, the moon and
the stars which you set in place--
What is man that you should be mindful of him; or the son of man that
you should care for him?
You have made him little less than the angels, and crowned him with
glory and honor.
You have given him rule over the works of your hands, putting all
things under his feet:
All sheep and oxen, yes, and the beasts of the field,
The birds of the air, the fishes of the sea, and whatever swims the
paths of the seas.' 77
George D. Crook
177. Psalm 8:4-9.
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